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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE JUVENILE
COMMITMENT CASES:
RECONCEPTUALIZING WHAT THE CHILD

HAS AT STAKE
James W. Ellis*
My remarks will focus on the constitutional issues surrounding
the treatment and habilitation of children with mental disabilities. I
believe that we need to rethink the premises on which we construct
our analysis of these problems, and it will surprise few in this audience that I conclude the Supreme Court of the United States did not
get it precisely right.
It is now nearly two decades since the Supreme Court announced its decisions in the juvenile commitment cases.' Rather than
recounting the widespread criticism that the Court's approach has
engendered, I will focus on the question of what liberty interest the
child has at stake when residential placement is proposed. 2 The reconsideration that I will propose has implications for both federal
and state constitutional litigation, 3 as well as for legislative proposals
that might be offered to extend greater procedural protections to
children. It will be my contention that both the Supreme Court and
some of the advocates for children have misperceived the range of
liberty interests that children have at stake in the mental disability

* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico, School of Law.
1. See Secretary of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640
(1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
2. For a much earlier discussion of these issues, see Lee E. Teitelbaum &
James W. Ellis, The Liberty Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their
Application, 12 FAMILY L.Q. 153 (1978). For those seeking even more archaic
sources and views, see James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: ParentalCommitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REv. 840 (1974) (cited in
Parham,442 U.S. at 611).
3. See generallyMichael L. Perlin, State Constitutionsand Statutes as Sources
of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?,20 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1249 (1987) (examining the expanding role of state constitutional provisions as a
specific source of rights for the mentally disabled as well as a parallel source of
rights for the disabled).
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system.
I. PARHAM'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A CHILD'S LIBERTY

The Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R. was one of the
first to employ the balancing methodology for procedural due process
which the Court had announced a few terms earlier.4 That formula,
first enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge,5 calls for weighing the individual's interest in the litigation against the state's interest in depriving the individual of the requested procedural protection.6 This balancing is to be done in the likelihood of erroneous deprivation of the
procedure and the probability that the requested procedure would
reduce that risk substantially. While Parham illustrates many other
features of the Mathews approach, I will focus exclusively on how to
ascertain when children have been erroneously deprived of their liberty.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Parham begins by
acknowledging that children do, in fact, have a liberty interest in
avoiding erroneous confinement in a mental hospital, and that they
are not barred from recognition of such an interest by the fact of
their minority.8 "It is not disputed that a child, in common with
adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment .... "9 The problem, as I see it, is in
determining what kinds of confinement may be "unnecessary."
The Court makes clear what it has in mind as an "erroneous"
commitment in the course of its discussion of whether a hearing
would reduce the risk of such errors: "It is unlikely, if not inconceivable, that a decision to abandon an emotionally normal, healthy child
and thrust him into an institution will be a discrete act leaving no trail
of circumstances."1 In other words, for an admission decision to be
an "error," it would have to be shown that the system had somehow
gone horribly astray and had confined Beaver Cleaver in Central
State Hospital in Milledgeville. Even if this horrific scenario did
somehow come to pass, however, we can be assured that Ward and

4. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (listing factors to be con-

sidered when reviewing for procedural due process).
5. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

6. See id. at 335.

7.
&
9.
10.

See id
See Parham,442 U.S. at 600.
Id (emphasis added).
Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
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June-if not Lumpy and Eddie Haskell-would blow the whistle.
The "concern of family and friends generally will provide continuous
1
opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be corrected.""
Few would dispute Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that the
commitment of a child who lacks any psychopathology would constitute an error. The problem is that it does not encompass the entire
range of errors in the context of the commitment of children. While
the commitment of a child without any mental problems or impairment is certainly erroneous, so is the commitment of children who do
have mental problems but who do not require institutionalization for
their treatment. The record in the Parham case itself is replete with
examples of children with mental or emotional problems whom the
state's mental health professionals concluded could be treated in settings less drastic than the state hospital at Milledgeville. Given the
severe consequences of institutionalization on the life of a child,
avoidance of unnecessary harms would seem to be an appropriate
function of individualized due process review. This is12 particularly
true where the duration of the confinement is extensive.
The scope of the universe of "errors" is crucial to the due process issue in Parham. If the only errors involve cases in which the system has mistakenly institutionalized a child who does not have mental health problems, it becomes easier to agree with the Court that
minimal procedures may be adequate. However, if we recognize that
it is also a substantial deprivation of liberty to confine a child whose
mental health problems do not require institutionalization, then the
due process calculus is altered.
The individual interest of a mentally disabled child whose condition can be addressed in a noninstitutional setting is substantial. Although it might appear, at first blush, that such a child has a smaller
stake than the child with no mental health problems at all, this may
not be true. While the nonpathological child would certainly be
frightened by the experience of being confined in a mental ward, we
could hope that this child's natural mental equilibrium would have
some success in putting the experience into some kind of context-

at 619 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,428-29 (1979)).
11. Id-

12. The Court noted that the "patients who were at Central State in December 1975 had been there, on the average, 456 days." Id. at 595. The average stay
at three other Georgia institutions ranged from 71 days to 127 days. See id. at
594. The Court exhibited remarkable equanimity toward this dramatic difference, observing only that there was "no explanation in the record for this large
variation from the average length of hospitalization at the other institutions." Id
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particularly if, as the Court speculates, such a hospitalization is of
very short duration. By contrast, the child with mental health problems is likely to be confined for much longer because the inappropriateness of his hospitalization would be less transparent. During that
time, the child would be more likely to develop the manifestations
and symptoms of the more disturbed patients in the facility, if not the
actual mental health problems themselves. Such a child would also
be particularly likely to come to identify himself or herself as seriously mentally iM1. Such self-stigmatization can have serious consequences that extend beyond childhood.
The next inquiry under the Mathews test would be the probability that the inappropriateness of the child's confinement will go undetected in the admissions process. 3 Certainly, the risk here is substantially higher than with the problem-free child about whom the
Court hypothesizes. Moreover, what is the likelihood that more formal procedures would prevent such erroneous commitments? Access
to counsel experienced in the mental disability field-such as the
lawyers who work for the Protection and Advocacy agencies in all
fifty states-would surely be of great assistance in identifying the inappropriateness of the proposed commitment and in identifying alternatives for treatment in a noninstitutional setting. Without such
assistance, however, a child with mental difficulties would find it impossible to review the records and documents in the case, confront
the weaknesses in the proposed commitment, and explore alternatives. Chief Justice Burger's disdain for the assistance that such lawyers could provide is even more at odds with reality than his naive assumption that the mental health system, left to its own devices, will
seldom if ever confine the wrong children.
The state's supposed interest in avoiding procedural protection
against the confinement of mentally disabled children who do not require institutionalization is illusory. Confinement to an institution
involves much greater financial expenditure than treatment in the
child's community, and thus the state has a fiscal interest in preventing treatment in the more confining and more expensive settings.
This is certainly part of the reason that modern civil commitment
statutes include among their criteria for an involuntary hospitalization order that the proposed placement be the least restrictive alter-

13. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Mathews approach dictates consideration of the risk of an erroneous depreciation of the interest through the procedures used. Id.
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native or consistent with the least drastic means principle.14 It would
certainly be penny wise and pound foolish for the state to insist on
saving the modest cost of a hearing for a child, but then to foot the
bill for the tens of thousands of dollars that the child's unnecessary
institutionalization would cost.
The problem of unnecessary restriction is not unique to the area
of juvenile commitment. Nonetheless, there are few legal settings in
which the consequences are more likely to be profoundly damaging.
For more than twenty years, lawyers in our field have been asserting
that the least drastic means principle is central to the meaning of substantive due process. This contention has become part of the controversy over the correct understanding of substantive due process. It
seems to me that if we take a more realistic and hard-headed approach to what constitutes an "error" in the commitment process for
children, we will have the means to address this serious problem as a
matter of procedural protections under Mathews.
II. THE CHILD ADVOCATES' CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A CHILD'S
LIBERTY
Just as the Supreme Court evidenced a rather myopic perspective on how a child's liberty interest should be understood, so too the
advocates for children sometimes take too short-sighted a view of
how that interest should be protected.
The problem is the focus on the age of the children. In formulating arguments that minors are entitled to procedural protections
against inappropriate commitments, much of the debate has centered
around the claimed right of children to make their own choices, or at
least to participate in the decision making. The key feature of these
arguments is promoting the minor's autonomy in shaping the choice
about accepting or rejecting residential placement. Thus the right to
a hearing becomes quite literally the right to be heard.
This is a perfectly reasonable argument. Teenagers who are said
to have mental health or emotional problems have a legitimate interest in having their views be part of the process in which treatment
decisions are made. Particularly when institutionalization is one of
the possibilities, that right to be heard certainly becomes compelling.
For such a decision to be made without the participation of the child
is certainly unacceptable.
14. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-6-13(I)(4)(Michie 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN.

§ 43-1-3(D) (Michie 1993 Repl.).
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Advocates for giving these teenagers the right to be heard have
sought to analogize to arguments they have made with somewhat
greater success on behalf of teenagers seeking to participate in decisions about terminating their pregnancies." Such an analogy was part
of the argument on behalf of the minors in Parham itself, and the
Court's rejection of this line of analysis was singularly unpersuasive.' 6
In each instance, the claimed right of participation by minors who are
sufficiently mature to understand the issue and to articulate a preference is compelling. A number of courts and a few legislatures have
followed this line of reasoning by permitting more mature teenagers-generally defined by attaining the age of twelve or fourteen-to
be heard regarding their proposed placement in a mental facility.17
The problem with this approach lies not in its recognition of the
15. Professor Costello makes a particularly articulate case for this analogy in
this Symposium. See Jan C. Costello, Making Kids Take Their Medicine: The
Privacy and Due ProcessRights of de Facto Competent Minors, 31 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 907 (1998).
16. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court found the juvenile abortion
cases inapposite:
[Planned Parenthood] involved an absolute parental veto over the
child's ability to obtain an abortion. Parents in Georgia in no sense have
an absolute right to commit their children to state mental hospitals; the

statute requires the superintendent of each regional hospital to exercise
independent judgment as to the child's need for confinement.
442 U.S. 584,604 (1983).
This line of reasoning, which was apparently sufficient to persuade Justice
Blackmun that the cases were distinguishable, mischaracterizes the relationship
between the cases. The key factor is not the scope of the power that the state
granted to the parents; it is whether there is any constitutionally protected role
for the minor when the state and the parents have aligned themselves together in
opposition to what may be the child's best interest in a crucial decision about
one's life.
In the abortion context, the Court has protected such minors both when
they are competent to make their own decisions, by protecting their right to decide, and when they are not competent, by vesting the power to decide in a court
charged to decide the issue on the girl's best interest, rather than letting it revert
to the parents. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(plurality opinion);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
It should be noted that the argument for minors in the commitment context
is more modest than the rights recognized in the abortion cases. The claim in
mental health cases is merely that children should be able to participate in a
hearing before a truly neutral decision maker; the abortion cases find that a
competent teenager can simply make her own choices, with the state's power
limited to requiring that a parent be informed. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990).
17. See, e.g., In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 927, 569 P.2d 1286, 1289, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 298, 301 (1977) (stating that "a minor of 14 years or more possesses rights
which may not be waived by the parent or guardian").
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due process rights of articulate teenagers in the mental health system,
but rather in its failure to address the liberty interests of children who
cannot articulate their own preferences. This is of particular concern
for younger children in the mental health system and for all children
in the mental retardation system.
If our conceptualization of commitment hearings for minors is
based upon their claim to autonomy in decision making, it is difficult
to make a persuasive case for hearings on the proposed institutionalization of an infant, or perhaps for any pre-adolescent. Similarly, if a
child's mental retardation is sufficiently disabling, holding a hearing
on the articulated preferences of the minor may appear to be a
pointless exercise. This approach to children's right to a hearing has
resulted in a system that leaves such younger and more disabled children without procedural protections. In those states that have provided hearings for minors, the hearings are generally reserved for
children in the mental health-as compared to mental retardationsystem, and are usually limited to older teenagers."
I view this as a problematic result, not because the older teenagers have no interest in receiving such a hearing, but because the
younger children and children with mental retardation have a particularly pressing need for hearings. The interest in this latter category of
children in receiving a hearing is not in vindicating their autonomous
choices, nor is its focus the importance of the dignitary interest in
"being heard" with regard to their preferences." Rather, the importance of hearings for these children stems from the particularly damaging consequences of unnecessary institutionalization. The harm
that any child may experience from an inappropriate residential
placement may be even greater for younger children and for those
with mental retardation. One reason for this is that their younger age
or greater handicap may make them more vulnerable to the potential
perils of institutionalization. In addition, the likelihood that the mistake will be corrected in a reasonable period of time is reduced if the
child has limited ability to communicate with those around him.
Moreover, some of these younger and less articulate children may be
particularly likely to come from families that will be reluctant to reintegrate them into the family after a prolonged period of institution18. But see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-6-12 to -13 (Michie 1997) (voluntary and

involuntary commitment, respectively).

19. Cf. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316
(1979) (recognizing a state constitutional interest in being heard before a liberty
deprivation).
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alization. The long-term, and even lifelong damage from incorrect
decisions to hospitalize these children may be particularly acute because children are particularly prone to both stigmatization by others
and to self-labeling and self-stigmatization, especially if their formative years are spent in the milieu of an institutional culture.
Viewed from the utilitarian perspective that the Mathews inquiry
is supposed to reflect, these children have a particularly high interest
in avoiding inappropriate residential placement and an unusually
high risk of such wrongful confinement occurring if there is no procedural protection in place.
The Mathews test also inquires about the likelihood that hearings would reduce the risk of error,20 and one may ask how hearings
would serve this function if the focus of the procedure is not on testing the appropriateness of the child's preferences. In cases involving
younger children and minors with mental retardation, the focus of the
hearing would be on putting the state to its proof and testing the adequacy of its assertion that the child needs to be placed in an institution. Central to the effective operation of such a procedural structure
would be the role of experienced counsel in evaluating and challenging weaknesses in the state's claims and in helping to explore noninstitutional alternatives. Modern mental health lawyers have developed these skills to a far greater extent than was true at the time of
the Parham litigation in the 1970s. We need to adapt our juvenile
commitment statutes to reflect the availability of such assistance and
our more complete understanding of.the risks of institutionalization
for these particularly vulnerable children.

20. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (requiring consideration of "the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.")

